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COMMENTS
NATIONAL PROHIBITION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Some recent decisions and rulings enforcing the Eighteenth Amend-
ment and the National Prohibition Act have brought those laws into
considerable importance in international aspects. The case, United
States v. Bengochea,1 the ruling of our Executive Department regard-
ing the Canadian schooner Emerald, and the case, United States v.
Schooner Grace and Ruby2 present a set of mooted questions in inter-
national law.3
The first and second holdings again raise the question whether a
littoral state has the legal privilege by way of self-defense to take pro-
tective police action outside its three-mile limit to prevent violation of
its municipal laws.4 The decision in the Bengochea case sustaining the
privilege, and the ruling of the State Department on the Emerald, which
apparently denies such privilege, represent the diversity of opinion on
the question which the executive and judicial departments of the gov-
1 (922, C. C. A. 5th.) 279 Fed. 537.
'(1922, D. Mass.) 283 Fed. 475.
'In the first case a Cuban vessel laden with intoxicating liquors sailed toward
the shores of the United States until within twelve miles thereof, but stopped
outside the three-mile limit with intent to deliver the cargo to boats coming from
shore, such cargo to be carried by them into port. While waiting for those boats
she was seized by the United States. The court sustained the seizure. In the
second case the Canadian schooner Emerald was seized about eight miles from
American shores while unloading intoxicating liquors into small boats for trans-
portation to the coast. The small boats appeared not to belong to the Emerald.
Thereafter, on representations from Great Britain, the State Department released
the Emerald. See N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, i9zz. On similar protests, all foreign
ships seized by the United States beyond the three-mile limit have been ordered
released by the Treasury Department; excepting only ships in the situation
involved in United States v. Grace and Ruby. See N. Y. TImES, November ii,
1922. In the last case the United States seized the British schooner Grace and
Ruby beyond the three-mile limit under the following circumstances: The vessel
brought a cargo of liquor, part of which at least belonged to an American owner,
within twelve miles of the coast of the United States, but outside the three-mile
limit. A boat from port came to meet her and received a part of the cargo in
the nighttime for transportation inland. The vessel lent three of her crew to help
make the landing, "and a dory belonging to the schooner was towed along pre-
sumably for use in landing the liquor or to enable the men to return to the
schooner after the liquor was landed." The attempted landing was discovered by
United States revenue officers, who seized the liquor and the next day dispatched
a revenue cutter to pursue and capture the schooner. Two days later she was
discovered and seized some four miles from shore and brought into port. She
was libelled for smuggling liquor in violation of the revenue laws and the
National Prohibition Act. Judge Morton sustained the seizure.
'Some confusion has obtained regarding the character of such privilege when
exercised by a state. If the privilege be allowed, does that constitute an extension
of territorial jurisdiction by the privileged state? Is it enforcing its laws as such
beyond the three-mile limit when it prevents the consummation of an offense
within that limit by physical action outside that limit? See oral argument of
Sir Charles Russell, 13 Fur Seal Arbitration Proceedings (1895) 298; cf. oral
argument of James C. Carter, 12 ibid. 244-247.
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eminent have held at least as far back as 1804 when Church v. Hub-
bart5 was decided.
Even in cases dealing with the privilege of self-defense in its broadest
sense, that is, the protection of persons and property from physical
injury, the political departments of our government seem to have been
over-jealous of the principle of "freedom of the seas." For example,
in the case of the United States warship Kearsarge and the Alabama,6
France foresaw that an attack would be made by the Kearsarge upon the
Alabama the instant the latter cleared the three-mile limit of France.
The artillery carried on shipboard had a greater range than three miles
and France justly feared stray shots. She suggested to the United
States that the attack be staged farther out on the high seas. The
American State Department replied: ". . . . the United States do not
admit a right of France to interfere with their ships of war at any dis-
tance exceeding three miles." If it was meant by this that France was
under a duty not to interfere with our ships outside the three-mile limit
there was obviously no privilege of interference even in the name of
self-defense.
In most instances, however, where our executive department has
taken this position, the privilege of self-help was claimed and- exercised
on the high seas by search and seizure of the menacing vessel with a
view to forfeiture.7  The denial of the privilege to make use of this
particular remedy, however, has been in terms general enough to deny
the very existence of any privilege of self-defense whatsoever if exer-
cised beyond the three-mile limit. "It is a well established principle,
asserted by the United States from the beginning of their national
independence ..... .and stated by the Senate in a esolution passed
unanimously on the I6th of June 1858, that 'American vessels on the
high seas in time of peace .... remain under the jurisdiction of the
country to which they belong and therefore any visitation, molestation,
or detention of such vessels by force, or by the exhibition of force, on
the part of a foreign power is in derogation of the sovereignty of the
United States.' "8 It is to be observed, however, in the Kearsarge case
'(18o4, U. S.) 2 Cranch. 187.
6I Moore, Digest of International Law (io6) 723; ef. Madison, Sec'y. of
State, to Messrs. Monroe and Pickney, May 17, i8o6 (two years after Church v.
Hubbart was decided). i Moore, op. cit. 722.
" The Virginius, 2 Moore, op. cit. 895, especially, Opinion, Williams, Atty. Gen.
at pp. 898-899; I Moore, op. cit. 732; The Mary Lowell, 2 Moore, op. cit.
sec. 315; Memorandum of Solicitor's Office, Department of State (igio) Wool-
sey, Municipal Seizures Beyond the Three Mile Limit, For. Rel. (1912) 1289; see
also i Hyde, International Law (1922) see. 229, note 3; Wheaton, International
Law (Dana's ed. 1866) note io8; cf. Privilege of Visitation, Search and Seizure
to Enforce our Revenue Laws outside Three Mile Limit but within Twelve Mile
Limit, Evarts, Sec'y. of State to Mr. Fairchild, Minister to Spain, Aug. ii, i88o,
2 Moore, op. cit. pp. 9o6-9o7.
' President Grant, annual message, Dec. I, 1873, 2 Moore, Op. cit. 897-898.
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that France in fact escorted the Alabama out of port with a French
man-of-war to a point some seven or nine miles from shore, and only
after the French escort departed did the battle take place. Apparently
the United States never attempted to question the exercise of the privi-
lege of self-defense by this method. From analogies in municipal law
and the necessities of the case, it seems that no question could be raised.9
If in the light of 'President Grant's message, as quoted above, a
littoral state may not even "molest" a foreign vessel by a mere
"exhibition of force" beyond the three-mile limit in defense of life and
property, then a fortiori action that is merely in the course of assisting
others to a contemplated violation of the public policy of such state,
for example that embodied in its "dry" laws, may not lawfully be inter-
fered with outside that limit. The ruling-of the Secretary of State in
the Emerald case is clearly consistent with.this conclusion. On this
basis the United States appears to be under a legal duty to suffer a
foreign vessel to approach the outside rim of the three-mile limit, not
bound to a United States port on legitimate business, but intending
rather to aid others to violate the municipal laws of this country, and
we may not "ward off" the intended blow by "any policing or abate-
ment beyond the three-mile limit. To do so would, apparently, "affect
the independence" of the foreign state concerned.
It may well be pondered why we are thus limited in our protective
police action as a littoral state to the exact limit of three miles.10 If
originally territorial extension of a littoral state to a limit of three miles
was accorded by international law "to protect their safety, peace,
and honour frorti invasion, disturbance and insult,"1 ' and if in modem
times invasion, disturbance, and insult have a longer range and have
become more troublesome, it seems, reasonable that the zone of pro-
tection should be further extended. It is not indispensable that the
limit be extended by a greater number of miles specifically with accom-
panying .proprietary claims thereto which nations now assert in the
"'The sovereign of the shore has a right, by international law, to require no
action to be taken by ships of other friendly nations by which his subjects should
be injured, or the peace of the shore disturbed." Wharton, International Law
Digest (1886) 114; see also Hall, International Law (4th ed. 1895) sec. 86;
Woolsey, International Law (i9oi) sec. 214; 2 Moore, op. cit. 981; Cobbett,
Leading Cases on International Law, (3d ed. igog) i68; i Hyde, op. cit. sec. 65.
"We can conceive, for instance, of a case in which armed vessels of nations with
whom we are at peace, might select a spot within common range of our coast for
the practice of their guns .... Supposing such vessels .... to be four miles
from the coast, could it be reasonably maintained that we have no police
jurisdiction over such culpable negligence?" i Wharton, op. cit. supra note 9,
14-115.
" For a valuable summary on the extent of marginal seas as a rule of interna-
tional law, see Evans, Cases on International Law (i917) 152, note; also i Hyde,
op. cit. secs. 141, 142, 143.
' Hopkinson, J., in United States v. Henry Kessler (1829, C. C. Pa.) i Baldwin,
15, at p. 35.
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three-mile limit, but rather that by international law a nation shall have
no right where its nationals have engaged in defying the policy of
another state as embodied in its reasonable municipal laws, although
they are apprehended even on the high seas as such offenders. This
would not seem to be "in derogation of the sovereignty" of such
nation.
12
Moreover, even under the rule as generally announced, that as a
matter of international law the privilege of self-help does not exist
beyond the three-mile limit, at least if exercised by search and seizure,
it is to be observed that one who undertakes a nefarious expedition
against the security or welfare of another state, will have no valid
private claim for personal inconvenience and loss.'13 "A nation will not
interfere to throw the mantl6 of its protection over one of its nationals
when that national has, for his own private ends, been running counter
to a just and reasonable law of a friendly power."' 4  Can a foreign
government justly assert in its own behalf a legal right under inter-
national law in such case which it will not assert in behalf of its own
nationals individually when the same transaction forms the entire basis
for both claims? It seems to be the view of the political departments
of this government that it can, and that by international law a foreign
government as such has the legal right that another state shall not act
outside its three-mile limit in protection of its "security, peace, and
honour," at least if such action takes the form of search and seizure.
Apparently this is true even though the nationals of that foreign state
whose acts present the question have no private rights therein.
The judicial department of our government takes a different view of
the question. The Supreme Court considered the matter in Church v.
Hubbard. In that case it appears that Portugal prohibited trade with
her colonies. An American vessel, Aurora, cleared from New York
bound for Portuguese colonies with goods on board for trade. The
Aurora was seized by Portugal some four or five leagues from the
shores of its South American colonies where she was anchor'ed. Mar-
shall, C. J., declared: "That the law of nations prohibits the exercise of
an act of authority over a vessel in the situation. of the Aurora; and
that this seizure is, on that account, a mere marine trespass .... cannot
be admitted. . . . Its (a nation's) power to secure itself from injury
"See oral argument of Sir Charles Russell, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. lo76;
Cobbett, loc. cit. supra note 9.
On this general question the following or like rule is sometimes suggested: "The
right of self-preservation is the first law of nations, as it is of individuals ...
All means which do not affect the independence of other nations are lawful to this
end." I Phillimore, International Law (1854) sec. 21o. Such statement is
undoubtedly true in its generality, but affords little assistance in deciding the real
question of what does "affect the independence of other nations."
I The Brig Mary Lowell, 3 Moore, International Arbitration Digest (1898)
2772-2777; The Deerhound, supra note 7; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of
Citizens Abroad (9,5) secs. 348, 361-363.
' Oral argument of Sir Charles Russell, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 1O79.
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may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory .... the
right of a belligerent to search a neutral vessel on the high seas for
contraband of war, is universally admitted, because the belligerent has
a right to prevent the injury done to himself by the assistance intended
for the enemy: so too, a nation has a right to prohibit any commerce
with its colonies. Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this
right is an injury to itself which it may prevent and it has a right to use
the means necessary for its prevention. These means do not appear to
be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which remain the same
at all times and in all situations. If they .... unnecessarily. . . . vex
and harass foreign lawful commerce foreign nations will resist their
exercise. If they are .... reasonable and necessary to secure their laws
from violation, they will be submitted to."1' 5 In other words, reason-
able police protection reasonably executed even by search and seizure
and for forfeiture by a littoral state is not per se wrong as a matter of
international law simply because the acts take place more than three
miles from the shore. Such views seem sound.'6
In the third case of this series,' 7 the British vessel Grace and Ruby
may be said to have constructively entered the American three-mile
limit.' The seizure, however, was beyond the three-mile limit. Appar-
ently the executive department is prepared to support the action in this
case. The decision as such is well within the principle of Church v.
Hubbart, upon which case Judge Morton relied. The apparent
approval by the executive department of the result of the decision sug-
gests however, that it is to be supported on some other or further rule
of international law. The doctrine of "hot pursuit" can be invoked.
The privilege of "hot pursuit," though stated in various ways,' 9 seems
fairly set forth in the following: "Take again the pursuit of vessels
out of the territorial waters, but which have committed an offence
against municipal law within territorial waters..... .. There is gen-
eral consent on the part of nations to the action of a state pursuing a
vessel under such circumstances . . . . it must be a hot pursuit-that is
" Supra note 5, at p. 234.
"See accord, Cockburn, C. J., in Regina v. Keyn (1876, Cr. App.) 13 Cox C. C.
403, 525, 527; Evans, op. cit. ,17o, note; contra, Wheaton, loc. cit. supra note 7;
cf. Woolsey, op. cit, supra note 7, 1291; cf. Le Louis (1817, Adm.) 2 Dod. 2IO,
at pp. 245, 255.
- Supra note 3.
192 Moore, op. cit. supra note 6, 985.
192 Westlake, International Law (19o4) 173; Woolsey, op. cit. supra note 9,
sec. 194; Cobbett, op. cit. supra note 9, 169, note; Hall, op. cit. supra note 9, sec.
8o; i Oppenhein, International Law (3d ed. 1920) sec. :266; Scott; Resolitions(1916) 115, 330; 2 Moore, op. cit. supra note 9, 985 et seq.; Story, J., in The
Maria na Flora (1826, U. S.) ii Wheat. 1, 42; see also The King v. Ship North
(19o5, Can.) ii Exch. 141, reviewing American cases; cf. Wheaton, loc. cit.
supra note 7.
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to say a nation cannot lie by for days or weeks and then say: 'You,
weeks ago committed an offense within the waters, we will follow you
for miles, or hundreds of miles, and pursue you.' As to that it must be
a hot pursuit, it must be immediate, and it must be within limits of
moderation. ' 20  It seems that the instant case satisfies this rule.
A second series of cases recently decided under the Eighteenth
Amendment and National Prohibition Act also involve questions of
international law.21 In The Cunard S. S. Co. and Anchor Line v. Mel-
Ion (1922, S. D.'N. Y.) 28- Fed.-, Learned Hand, J., decided that
the carrying of intoxicating liquors as sea stores on board foreign mer-
chant vessels was "transportation" and prohibited in American waters
by those laws. By a second ruling in the same case, American ships
were prohibited from carrying liquors for beverage purposes on the
high seas since the Amendment applied to "all territory subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States.2 2
Two general questions present themselves: first, whether the United
States has the legal privilege under the rules of international law to
execute its prohibition laws in the cases under consideration; secondly,
whether they were intended to be so executed. The first question in
turn raises two issues, namely, has the United States the privilege to
enact laws (i) for foreign merchant vessels while within our marginal
waters and (2) for American vessels while on the high seas or in mar-
"0 Oral argument of Sir Charles Russell, op. cit. supra note 4, at P. 1079.
"The restriction of the permission within the bounds stated may readily be
explained by the abuses which would spring from a right to waylay and bring in
ships at a subsequent time, when the identity of the vessel .... might be doubtful."
Hall, op. cit. supra note 9, sec. 8o.
So much of the Amendment and Act as are here material read as follows;
i8th Amendment, sec. I: "After one year from the ratification of this Article the
manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory
subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prolibited."
"No person shall on or after the date when the i8th Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States goes into effect, manufacure, sell, barter, transport,
import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor except as author-
ized in this Act, and all the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed to
the end that the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage may be prevented." The
National Prohibition Act, Act of Oct. 28, 1919 (41 Stat at L. 305).
'Prior to Oct 6, 1922, but subsequent to the effective dates of the Amendment
and Act, foreign and American merchant vessels were allowed by the United
States Treasury Department to carry liquors as a part of their sea stores for
beverage purposes, which, when brought within American waters, were locked up
and sealed by Treasury Department officials, so to remain until the vessels departed
our waters. On Oct. 6, 1922, the United States Attorney General rendered an
opinion relying on Grogan v. Walker & Sons, Ltd., and Anchor Line, Ltd. v.
Aldrige (1922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 423, wherein he ruled that the Amendment and
Act prohibit the service and transportati6n of intoxicating liquors on American
ships at sea, and the transportation of intoxicating liquors on all vessels within
American waters. On the same day President Harding directed the Secretary of
the Treasury to execute the laws accordingly.
COMMENTS
ginal waters of foreign states? The. authorities seem conclusive that a
littoral state may enact legislation binding upon foreign merchant ves-
sels while they are within its marginal waters and not merely passing
through 3 Likewise, by a long line of decisions the jurisdiction of a
littoral state follows its vessels on the high seas and into foreign ports .2
These points are not seriously contested in the cases referred to, but
the second general question is made the primary issue. It is contended
by the foreign vessel owners that our "dry" laws were never intended
to prohibit them from carrying liquors in and out of American waters
if they were locked up under seal and were not available for beverage
purposes within American waters. American owners argue that these
laws are not to be deemed applicable to their vessels while on the high
seas or in foreign waters chiefly because they are not then within
the provision "all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof, (United
States)" as set forth in the Amendment.2 5
No consideration of these arguments will be undertaken here further
than to make brief reference to the recent cases of Grogan v. Walker
and Sons, Ltd., and Anchor Line Ltd. v. Aldridge.2 1 In theAnchor Line
case the plaintiffs sought to make a transshipment of a cargo of liquors
from one British ship to another in New York harbor. In the Walker
case the plaintiff sought to make a shipment of liquors by rail from
Canada across the United States to Mexico. In both cases the majority
'Regina v. Cunningham (1858, Cr. App.) 8 Cox C. C. 1o4; Regina v. Kept,
supra note 16, 434; The Kestor (igoi, D. Del.) Iio Fed. 432; The Ester (i9i1
E. D. S. C.) 19o Fed. 216; United States v. Dickelbnan (1875) 92 U. S. 520; see
also The Exchange (1812, U. S.) 7 Cranch. 116; Norms (192o) 2o CoL. L. REV.
207, 479; Evans, op. cit. supra note io, 181; Gregory, Jurisdict n over Foreign
Ships in Territorial Waters (1904) 2 MiCr. L. REV. 333; Hyde, op. cit. supra note
7, secs. 221, 226, and authorities cited. British Foreign Office, Oct 9, 1922, refer-
ring to the ruling of the Attorney General, supra note 22; "It is domestic legisla-
tion in which Great Britain has no right to interfere. The United States
Government has a perfect right to enact shipping laws that it thinks fit and to
enforce them within the three mile limit."
" The King v. Brizac and Scott t18o3, K. B.) 4 East 163; Regina v. Anderson
(I868, Cr. App.) iI Cox C. C. 198; I Wharton, op. cit. supra note 9, 123; 49
L. R. A. 273, note. See also 8 Ops. Att'y. Gen. (1856) 73; Wheaton, op. cit.
supra note 7, io6; Evans, op. cit. supra note io, 181.
Under the ruling of Judge Hand, American owners will be placed in an awkward
situation in some instances. For example, it appears that by the laws of some
foreign countries ships must carry a daily ration of liquors for passengers and
crew. Our laws prohibit it. Such cases must be cared for by treaty if the
decision of Judge Hand is sustained.
There seems to be some judicial opinion bearing against the general conten-
tions of both foreign and American owners, expressed prior to Judge Hand's deci-
sions as well as prior to the ruling of the Attorney General, supra note 22. See
United States v. Thirty-six Cases of Intoxicating Liquor (1922, S. D. Tex.) 281
Fed. 243 (re foreign owners) ; United States v. Two Hundred Fifty-four Bottles
of Intoxicating Liquor (1922, S. D. Tex.) 281 Fed. 247 (re American owners).
"Supra note 22.
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of the court held that the plaintiffs were prohibited by the laws in
question. Holmes, J., remarked, inter alia: "The routine arguments
are pressed 27 that this country does not undertake to regulate the habits
of people elsewhere and that the reference to beverage purposes and use
as a beverage show that it is not attempting to do so ; that it has no inter-
est in meddling with transportation across its territory if leakage in
transit is prevented as it has been; that the repeal of statutes and
treaties by implication is not to be favored; and that even if the letter
of a law seems to have that effect a thing may be within the letter yet
not within the law when it has been construed. We appreciate all this,
but are of opinion that the letter is too strong in this case.
"The x8th Amendment meant a great revolution in the policy of this
country . . . it did not confine itself in any meticulous way to the
use of intoxicating liquors in this country..... .. It is obvious that
those whose wishes and opinion were embodied in the Amendment
meant to stop the whole business. They did not want intoxicating
liquor in the United States and reasonably may have thought that if they
let it in some of it was likely to stay."
If such be the vigor of the "letter" of the law, it seems that it would
be possible for the Supreme Court to answer the arguments in question
with a ruling that here is another opportunity to stop at least a part of
"the whole business," and that again we must not "let it in" because
"some of it [is] likely to stay."' 28
WESLEY A. STURGES
See the dissenting opinion of MjcKenna, J., in which Day and Clarke, JJ.,
concurred.
'The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bowmalt (Nov. 13, 1922)
U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, 1922, No. 69, applying sec. 35 of the United States
Criminal Code also seems pertinent to the contention of the American owners.
Sec. 35 reads in part: ". .. . whoever shall enter into any agreement, combination
or conspiracy to defraud the Government of the United States .... by obtaining
.... the payment or allowance of any false claim .... shall be fined ... ." The
defendants, American citizens, were prosecuted thereunder, the indictment laying
the offense to have occurred on the high seas. An objection was taken to the
jurisdiction. Chief Justice Taft, holding against the objection, said: "Some ....
offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Govern-
ment because .of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are such that
to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to
curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity
for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries
as at home. In such cases Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific
provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries,
but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense." After commenting
on sec. 35 he concludes: "We cannot suppose that when Congress enacted the
statute or amended it, it did not have in mind that a wide field for such frauds
upon the Government was in private and public vessels of the United States on
the high seas and in foreign port and beyond the land jurisdiction of the United
States and therefore intended to include them in the section."
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RESCISSION FOR FRAUD AND PREFERENCE IN BANKRUPTCY
Although the preference sections of the Bankruptcy Act have given
rise to much litigation, new and interesting problems still emerge.
Such a problem was recently presented by the bankrupt estate of Bos-
ton's "wizard" in high finance, Charles Ponzi. Lowell v. Brown (1922.
D. Mass.) 280 Fed. 193.1 Ponzi's scheme was to borrow money, giving
in return his ninety-day note for a sum equal to 150 per cent. of the
loan. He represented that by dealing in foreign exchange he could
quickly make ioo per cent. profit and that he was generously dividing
this profit with investors who furnished him money. In December,
i919, his capital did not exceed $150; by July, i92o, he was receiving
deposits from investors at the rate of $i,ooo,ooo per week. His scheme
was simply the old fraud of paying the early comers out of the money
received from the later ones. The defendant advanced his money and
received Ponzi's note shortly before the bubble was pricked. Within
two weeks the newspapers carried flaring headlines exposing the scheme
and announcing Ponzi's insolvency. Immediately thereafter, and
within four months of Ponzi's bankruptcy, the defendant demanded,
and was paid, the amount of his original advance, the note being sur-
rendered. Ponzi's trustee in bankruptcy sued to recover this payment
as a voidable preference.2  The District Court held that the defendant
received no preference but merely rescinded for fraud and obtained
repayment of his own money.
It is well settled that if one is induced by fraud to sell goods on
credit, the defrauded vendor may rescind the transaction and reclaim
his goods, unless the rights of innocent purchasers for value have inter-
vened. The vendee's trustee in bankruptcy does not stand in the shoes
of an innocent purchaser for value, and consequently the defrauded
vendor may reclaim the goods from such trustee." It obviously follows
that retaking them before bankruptcy, by exercising the "right of
1November 13, 1922, the decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.
See sec. 6ob, Bankruptcy Act, Act of July i, i898 (30 Stat. at L. 544) as
amended by Act of Feb. 5, 1903 (32 Stat. at L. 797) and Act of June i5, I9o6 (34
Stat, at L. 267) and Act of June 25, i9io (36 Stat at L. 838).
'Donaldson v. Farwell (1876) 93 U. S. 631 (under Act of 1867); Openhym v.
Blake (i9o7, C. C A. 8th) 157 Fed. 536, aff'd. without mention of this point
(IgIO) 216 U. S. 322, 30 Sup. Ct 309 (under Act of i898).
This is still true despite the 1g1o Amendment to sec. 47a (2) of the Bankruptcy
Act which gives the trustee in bankruptcy the rights of a lien creditor. i Black,
Bankruptcy (3d ed. 1922) sec. 36o; In; re Gold (913, C. C. A. 7th) 21o Fed. 410;
Jones v. Hobbie Grocery Co. (1917, C. C. A. 8th) 246 Fed. 431. But if the state
law should subordinate the rights of the defrauded vendor to those of the vendee's
attaching creditor, the goods could not be reclaimed from the trustee. See It re
Whately Bros. (1gI9, D. Ga.) i99 Fed. 326.
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rescission,"4 is not the receipt by the vendor of a preference-retaking
them has not diminished the bankrupt's estate available for creditors,
nor has the rescinding vendor received them as a creditor but as owner.5
One having this "right of rescission" may, without receiving a prefer-
ence, even accept payment to the extent of the value of the goods which
he might have reclaimed, since relinquishment of his equitable rights in
the property supplies a present consideration for the payment. 6 If the
goods themselves cannot be reclaimed, but money or other property can
be identified as the proceeds of them, then -equity treats the fraudulent
vendee as a constructive trustee of such proceeds and gives the
defrauded vendor an equitable claim thereto.7 But if the goods or their
proceeds cannot be identified, then the defrauded vendor no longer
has a "right of rescission" or an equitable lien on, or claim to, specific
propertyS; he becomes merely a creditor 9 and a payment to him by the
'The customary phrase "right of rescission" analytically considered shows that
the defrauded vendor has the legal privilege of rescission and the legal power by
rescinding to destroy the vendee's title to the goods and his contractual duty to
pay for them and to create in himself all the rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities of ownership of the goods, except as against innocent purchasers for
value. See COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoTRNAL, 929, note i. See Gould v.
Cayuga, etc. Bank (1881) 86 N. Y. 75, at p. 8o: "The effect of the avoidance of
an agreement on the ground of fraud is to place the parties in the same position as
if it had never been made; and all rights which are transferred, released or created
by the agreement are revested, restored or discharged by the avoidance."
'Actual decisions are few; dicta are not so infrequent. Illinois Parlor Frame
Co. v. Goldman (igig, C. .C. A. 7th) 257 Fed. 300; Lowell v. Brown, supra, at
p. i98: ''No one contends that the return of goods procured by fraud constitutes
a preference"; Mulroney Mfg. Co. v. Weeks (1gi) 185 Iowa, 714, at p. 718, 171
N. W. 36, at p. 38: "We think the plaintiff was clearly entitled to retake the
goods. The exercise of such right .... does not work a preference in violation
of the provisions of the federal statute.....
'Illinois Parlor Frame Co. v. Goldman, supra note 5, at p. 3o1: "Appellant
concededly had a right to rescind. . . . Clearly a return of the goods would not
be a preference; to the extent of their value, payment could no more effectuate
a preference; neither transaction would diminish the estate to which bankrupt was
then entitled. That appellant did not expressly assert a right of rescission is
immaterial; it relinquished that right in confirming the sale; it then gave up a
property interest equal to the value of the goods then on hand. To that extent
the transfer was for a present consideration and not preferential."
See Ames, Following Misappropriated Property (1906) ig HARv. L. REv. 511,
at p. 513, note 6; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher (1895) 145 N. Y. 552,
4o N. E. 2o6; People's Nat. Bank v. Mulhollatid (1917) 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E.
46; In re Mulligan (19o2, D. Mass.) 116 Fed. 715; In re Midland Motor Co.
(1915, C. C. A. 7th) 224 Fed. 368.
n re Mulligan, supra note 7; In re Matthews' Sons (1916, C. C. A. 2d) 238
Fed. 785; Schuyler v. Littlefield (1913) 232 U. S. 707, 34 Sup. Ct. 466.
"See In re Richard (i9oo, E. D. Tenn.) 1O4 Fed. 792; Watson v. Thompson
(1879) 12 R. I. 466, at p. 471: "It remained a resulting [constructive] trust or
equity in the price, or in the property in which the price was invested, so long as it
could be traced specifically; and when it ceased to be specifically traceable, it
became simply a personal debt or demand to be recoverable of [the wrongdoer], or
out of his estate, like any other personal debt or demand."
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bankrupt within the prescribed four months would seem clearly to be
a preference.' 0 These principles undoubtedly apply with equal force
to money fraudulently obtained so long as the identical money or its
proceeds can be traced.1' The vital consideration, therefore, in decid-
ing between conflicting contentions of rescission or preference, is
identification of the res as to which the defrauded claimant has a "right
of rescission" or an equitable claim.
When money fraudulently obtained has been mingled with other
money, or deposited by the wrongdoer in his bank account, identifi-
cation of the res becomes increasingly difficult. If the account is com-
posed partly of the claimant's money and partly of the wrongdoer's,
the claimant is given the option of an equitable lien on, or (on princi-
ples of a constructive trust) a pro rata share of, the deposit. 2 When the
account has fluctuated in amount this is usually worked out by the
fiction" of a presumption that the wrongdoer's intention is to draw out
first his own funds rather than those of the claimant, and consequently
any balance which has constantly remained in the account since the
deposit of the claimant's funds will be a res identifiable by him, and as
to which he may assert an equitable lien or a constructive trust.14 But
if the bank account is composed of the funds of several defrauded
claimants and is insufficient to satisfy them all, the courts apply the rule
in Clayton's Case'--that the first withdrawals are charged against the
first deposits-and reach the conclusion that the defrauded claimants
are entitled to be paid in the inverse order in which their moneys went
into the account.18 A more just result would be reached by treating the
"In re Kearney (igog, E. D. Pa.) 167 Fed. 995; In re Dorr (1912, C. C. A.
9th) 196 Fed. 292; Clarke v. Rogers (1913) 228 U. S. 534, 33 Sup. Ct. 587.
'In re Stewart (igio, N. D. N. Y.) 178 Fed. 463; It re Syracuse Gardens Co.
(1916, N. D. N. Y.) 231 Fed. 284; In re Bolognesi & Co. (igi, C. C. A. 2d)
254 Fed. 770; see Scott, Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money (1913)
27 HARv. L. REv. 125.
1See Scott, op. cit. supra note ii, and cases cited at p. 127.
'Knatchbull v. Hallett (1879) L. R. 13 C. Div. 696; In re Brown & Co.
(1911, S. D. N. Y.) 189 Fed. 432, at p. 434: "So in this case the claimants may
elect to retain a lien upon the total deposit after the first withdrawal. This is the
effect of the case of Knatchbull v. Hallett, a case which has been very frequently
cited and the decision of which has been followed many times. This is sometimes
stated as a presumption of the trustee's intent, but that is a fiction." See also
Prirteau v. Granfield (1911, S. D. N. Y.) 184 Fed. 480, 485; Ames, op. cit. supra
note 7, at p. 518.
" See supra note 12. This fiction, however, will' not be applied to the benefit of
the wrongdoer or his general creditors at the expense of the claimant: where the
wrongdoer invested the moneys first withdrawn and dissipated the balance, the
claimant was given an equitable lien on the investment. In re Oatway [19o3] 2
Ch. 356.
"5 (1816, Ch.) i Met. 572.
"In re Stenning [1895] 2 Ch. 433; Hewitt v. Hayes (igio) 205 Mass. 356, 91
N. E. 332; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County (I9 i 2, C. C. A. 8th) 194
Fed. 593; In re Bolognesi & Co., supra note 11.
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defrauded claimants as equitable co-owners in proportion to the
amounts contributed by them and thus making the loss resulting from
withdrawals, like gains from a rise in value, to be shared by them
pro rata.1
7
In the case under discussion the court finds that the defendant's
money was deposited in Ponzi's account in the Hanover Trust Company
and that it there remained until repaid to him by check drawn on this
account. If that finding of fact is true, the decision that he received
no preference seems indisputably sound. But what evidence supports
that finding? On July 2oth, when the defendant Brown advanced his
$1,2oo, Ponzi's bank balance was $68i,ooo. Before August 2d, when
Brown was repaid, some $3,000,000 had been withdrawn from the
account and about $2,500,000 deposited so that a balance of $12o,ooo
remained on that date. But all of the deposits were funds obtained
from other defrauded lenders who had the same "right of rescission"
as Brown.-8 Applying the rule of Clayton's Case, it would follow
that Brown had no equitable claim upon the August 2d balance, because
his contribution to the account had been exhausted as soon as with-
drawals subsequent to July 2oth totaled $681,ooo. Applying the more
equitable constructive trust theory, it would follow that Brown had
equitable ownership of a fractional share of the balance, the numerator
of this fraction being his deposit and the denominator the aggregate of
the deposits of money belonging to defrauded claimants. The District
Court adopted the former view, but avoided the application of the rule
of Clayton's Case as follows: Subsequently, victims whose claims aggre-
gated about $4,000,000 filed claims in bankruptcy, thus electing to treat
themselves as creditors ab initio rather than as cestuis qui trustent;
therefore money received by Ponzi from such victims must be treated
as Ponzi's money, that is, money loaned to him, not held by him as
trustee ex naleficio; consequently the deposit in the Hanover Trust
Company was of a mixed fund made up in part of the trustee's (Ponzi's)
own money and in part of money belonging to the defendant and other
cestuis; and, applying the presumption that a wrongdoing trustee first
withdraws his own money, it follows that all withdrawals subsequent
'
TSee Scott op. cit. supra note Ii, at p. 13o, note 15; also In re British Red
Cross Balkan Fund [1914] 2 Ch. 419, discussed in (914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 193.
Compare the rule with respect to fungibles, such as grain or stock certificates,
belonging to several claimants: they must reclaim pro rata. Duel v. Hollins
(1915) 241 U. S. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. 615. Compare also McBride v. Potter-Lovell
Co. (1897) 169 Mass. 7, at p. 9, 47 N. &_ 242, at p. 243: "But where several
different parties have thus been exposed to loss by the fraud of their common
agent, it is more equitable that the -burden of the loss should be shared pro rata!"
"The court said at p. 202: "Undoubtedly, as already set forth, all the deposits
made in the Hanover Trust Company were funds originally belonging in equity to
Ponzi's dupes; they all had a right to give up their notes and demand their moneys
back, because obtained from them by fraud."
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to Brown's deposit were of Ponzi's own money and that the balance of
August 2d included 'Brown's deposit.19
With respect, it is submitted that this ingenious argument is falla-
cious. The fact was that Ponzi's chose in action against the bank for
the $I20,000 balance existing on August 2d was the product of the
money of all his dupes whose funds had been deposited in that account
and who still had claims against him for the return of their money.
If on August 2d Ponzi had been adjudged bankrupt and the bank bal-
ance had passed to his trustee in bankruptcy, Brown could not have
reclaimed $I,200 out of this balance. Applying the rule in Clayton's
Case, as the court did, he could have reclaimed nothing, because the
fund belonged to later dupes; applying the constructive trust theory
he could have reclaimed only a small fraction of his original loan. That
is to say, either he had lost his "right of rescission" or equitable lien
completely, becoming simply a creditor to the full amount of his claim,
or he had lost it as to all but an-insignificant sum, becoming simply a
creditor as to the balance of his loan. Now suppose these later dupes
failed to assert their "right of rescission" or equitable liens. Obviously
their share of the bank balance would have belonged to Ponzi's trustee
in bankruptcy and would not have increased the amount Brown was
entitled to reclaim. The account belonged to the trustee subject to
their equitable liens. If their liens were lost by failure to assert them,
the property remained the trustee's freed thereafter from their equity.
Certainly there would be no reason to presume that they intended to
benefit Brown by failing to assert their equitable claims. Their inten-
tion would naturally be to benefit the trustee and thereby to increase
the assets of the estate in which they as creditors might share. No
reason of justice or of policy is suggested why their failure to assert
their equitable liens should be given the legal effect of benefiting Brown.
Yet that would be the result under the court's ingenious theory which
piles fiction upon fiction. The first fiction is that the money loaned by
dupes who did not rescind must be treated from the beginning as money
loaned to him, not money held by him as a trustee ex nzaleficio. And
the conclusion is that the bank balance was a fund made up in part of
the wrongdoer's money and in part of Brown's and that of other
cestuis who did not rescind. The next fiction is the presumption that
the wrongdoer intended to draw out his own money first. And the con-
clusion is that no part of Brown's money had been withdrawn on
August 2d. Thus the court would find as a fact-that which obviously
would not be true-that all of Brown's money had remained in the
bank balance which passed to the trustee in bankruptcy.
The foregoing argument has proceeded upon the supposition that
Brown was seeking reclamation from the trustee in bankruptcy. In
fact Brown was paid before bankruptcy proceedings were begun; but
See pp. 202-203.
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the argument is thought to be equally applicable to the actual situation,
for if Brown had on August 2d lost either completely or in part his right
to reclaim the property then a payment on that date would be a
preference either as to the whole amount or as to all in excess of his
equitable lien. Such payments the trustee may recover under section
6o of the Bankruptcy Act. It is believed, therefore, that a decision
contrary to that reached by the District Court would have been more
just and more consonant with the spirit of the bankruptcy legislation.
Since the foregoing criticism of the District Court's opinion was
written the Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment.2 0 The
reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals is somewhat different from
that of the lower court and the several points of the upper court's opin-
ion to which the writer wishes to call attention will be taken up briefly.
(i) The Court of Appeals says that proof that the defendant's
money was deposited in the bank account and that the account was not,
before the rescission and withdrawal, depleted to a sum less than the
defendant's claim, is sufficient evidence that his money remained in
the account. As between the claimant and Ponzi, or as between the
claimant and Ponzi's general creditors, this is a fair rule. But between
victims who have equal "rights of rescission" it is not fair and is not the
rule which the courts apply.21 The fair rule would make the victims
bear the loss of withdrawals pro rata. The creditors whom the trustee
in bankruptcy represents were all victims of Ponzi's fraud, and their
proofs of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings were not for the face
of their notes, but only for the amounts which they respectively
advanced. The trustee in bankruptcy should be able to rely upon the
equities of the other victims.
22
(2) The upper court said that the rule in Clayton's Case is inappli-
cable because it does not appear that the money in the bank account
was ever depleted to a sum insufficient to pay all of Ponzi's victims who
sought rescission, his victims being divided into two classes: those who
rescinded and received back what they paid in; and those who risked
their money with him until it was too late to get it back. The question
here raised is whether the victims who admittedly could have rescinded
but did not do so as promptly as Brown and others who were paid, shall
suffer by reason of that fact. From the time the newspapers exposed
the fraud, there was a "run" on Ponzi's office until his bank account was
overdrawn on August 9 th. Were it not for the Bankruptcy Act,
promptness in getting paid might benefit the victims who first rescinded,
but the very purpose of the preference sections is to deprive creditors
who receive payment with knowledge of the debtor's insolvency of the
benefit of their diligence. Brown was only a creditor, except to the
"See supra note I.
See sura notes 16 and 17.
See In re Mulligan, supra note 7, at p. 721.
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extent that his own money was in the bank account. There seems to
be no more reason to say his money was in the August 2d balance than
that of any other victim whose money had previously been traced into
the fund. If the rule in Clayton's Case is not applied, the equitable
constructive trust theory should be.
(3) "Holding, as we do, that the burden of proof is upon the plain-
tiffs (when they seek to recover a preference), we cannot say that the
money the defendants received was charged with a trust in favor of
anyone else." Is this a sound conclusion? Did not the plaintiffs sus-
tain the burden when they showed, as the court concedes, that all the
money handled by Ponzi originally came from victims of his fraud?
It would seem that a "right to rescind," no less than an attempt to take
advantage of that right, should give the victims an equity in the fund23
and, for reasons already presented, that a failure to assert the equitable
remedy (especially when it was lost without fault or laches) should
enure to the benefit of the estate rather than to the benefit of the
rescinding victim who accepts payment with knowledge of Ponzi's
insolvency.
(4) "As between the general creditors of the bankrupt who lost their
right to rescind and the defendants who did rescind, the former cannot
demand that the estate of the bankrupt be augmented by the application
to the general estate of property that never rightfully belonged to the
bankrupt." It has already been noted that the victims who proved in
bankruptcy proved only for the amounts they advanced and that they
lost their rights as rescinding claimants simply because the bank
account was exhausted by payments to other victims. Whether or not
Brown was paid with money "that never rightfully belonged to the
bankrupt" is the very issue in dispute. To the writer it seems that the
victims whom the trustee represents have a stronger claim to it than
does the defendant. The rule which the court has laid down permits
defrauded creditors to scramble for payment, and rewards the diligent
even though he knows he is receiving a greater percentage of his claim
than other victims with the same character of claims will receive. The
victims who did not scramble before Ponzi's door for a preference pay-
ment are now being doubly penalized; they are being given dividends
on the amounts they paid in, not the amounts they were promised, just
as if in fact they had rescinded; and the fund from which their poor
dividends are to be paid has been depleted by payment in full to those
who scrambled. To hold a payment under such circumstances to be a
voidable preference would, it is believed, be more consistent with the
letter and the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act. T. W. S.
"Ames, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 518: "The cestui que trust has an option, the
moment the coins are mixed in the bag, to claim either a moiety of the coins, or
a charge upon the whole to the amount of the coins originally held in trust for
him .... "
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RESUSCITATION OF THE WARRANTY IN FIRE INSURANCE
The amazing vitality as well as the iniquity of the warranty in insur-
ance law is strikingly exhibited in Dawsons, Ltd. v. Bonnin (1922,
H. L.) 38 T. L. R. 386, recently decided by the House of Lords. A
bare majority of the Lords sitting, Viscount Haldane, Viscount Cave,
and Lord Dunedin, against the dissent of Viscount Finlay and Iord
Wrenbury, affirmed the judgment of the Scotch Court of Sessions.
Incidentally the decision also makes unpleasantly manifest how far
apart the courts of the two great English-speaking peoples have drawn
in dealing with issues that arise under contracts of insurance. The
facts are typical. A zealous agent of the defendants, underwriters of
Lloyd's, solicits the plaintiffs to insure their motor lorries with the
defendants. The agent himself fills out the proposal form of his own
knowledge, asking no information of the plaintiffs, whose secretary
initialled the proposal so written without observing that the statement
as to the place where the lorries were usually garaged was erroneous.
In the trial court it was clearly proved, as agreed by all the sitting
members of the House, that this statement was wholly immaterial, and
that the inadvertent error worked no prejudice to the insurers. Yet
when one of the lorries covered by the policy was burned, the defen-
dants refused to pay on the ground that a warranty was broken. The
policy declared that the proposal attached thereto "shall be the basis of
the contract and be held as incorporated therein," and at another place
set forth the "conditions of insurance." The fourth of these condi-
tions was in these terms: "Material misstatement or concealment of
any circumstance by the insured material to assessing the premium
herein, or in connexion with any claim, shall render the policy void."
Since the misstatement in the proposal was immaterial, it is manifest
that there was no breach of the express condition quoted. The defen-
dants were thus thrown back upon a claim that the statement as to the
place of garaging was made a warranty by the declaration made in the
policy that the proposal was the basis of the contract. It is believed
that no American court, state or federal, would have entertained such a
claim. For while the American courts in construing marine policies
still remain faithful to the unfortunate and fanciful rule laid down by
Lord Mansfield,1 that the truth of any statement, however trifling, made
in an insurance policy, is a condition of the contract, and that any
inaccuracy in such statement, although immaterial to the risk, or actually
decreasing it to the benefit of the underwriter, nevertheless wholly
avoids the contract. But this harsh rule was early discarded in con-
struing fire2 and life' policies, and the courts came to hold that a state-
'DeHahn v. Hartley (1786, K. B.) i Durn. & E. 343.
'O'Niel v. Buffalo Fire Ins. Co. (849) 3 N. Y. 122; First National Bank v.
Ins. Co. (1877) 95 U. S. 673.
'Fitch v. American Popular Life Ins. Co. (0875) 59 N. Y. 557.
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ment or promise, although written in the policy itself, was not to operate
as a warranty unless expressly and unequivocally made a condition on
which depended the existence of the contract or of the underwriter's
duty to pay. Even though the policy may expressly declare the state-
ments in the application to be warranties, the untruth of which will
avoid the contract, yet if subsequent references in the policy to a
requirement of good faith on the part of the insured, or to tlie conceal-
ment or misrepresentation of material facts, or other qualifying provi-
sions, raise any doubt as to the intention of the parties, as expressed in
the instrument as a whole, the doubt will be resolved against the insurer,
who chose the language used, and in favor of the validity of the
contract.4 In Reppond v. National Life Insurance Co.,5 a provision in
the policy "warranted" the statements in the application "to be full,
complete and true, and without suppression of any (material)
fact.. . .," and declared the application to be the basis of the contract.
It was held that such statements were but representations, the inaccu-
racy of which would affect the contract only if they were material. 6
Put shortly, the American courts say that parties may, if they wish, be
so foolish as to make the validity of an important contract dependent
upon the accuracy of an unimportant and immaterial statement, and if
they do so they will be held to the agreement as they have made it,7 but
they will not be held to have intended such a silly thing if any other con-
struction can reasonably be put upon the language used.8 Lord Mans-
field's warranty is simply treated in fire and life insurance as it would
be treated in the general law of contracts. 9 It is distressing to see it
restored by the House of Lords to its pristine vigor and full capacity
for mischief in England.1
The dissenting judges in the House of Lords, taking the same view
as the American courts, contended that the provision in the policy declar-
ing that the proposal should be the basis of the contract should be read
in connection with the fourth provision quoted above, thus showing that
the parties intended the statements of the proposal to be representations,
and not warranties; but the majority thought the two provisions stood
apart, and that "basis of the contract" could not mean other than
" See First National Bank v. Ins. Co., supra note 2; Moulor 'v. American Life
Ins. Co. (1884) III U. S. 335, 4 Sup. Ct. 466.
' (19o7) IOO Tex. 519, I01 S. W. 786.
'See the cases cited in ii L. R. A. (N. s.) 981, note.
"Jeffries v. Life Ins. Co. (1874, U. S.) 22 Wall. 47.
'See an extreme, and, it is submitted, an unsound application of this doctrine in
Hoffiman v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1922, Pa.) 117 Atl. 917.
'See Corbin, Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent(1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 421, 427; Vance, The History of the Development of the
Warranty in Insurance Law (1911) 20 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 523.
"
0It had been dealt some heavy blows in previous English decisions. See, for
example, the scathing language of Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in Joel v. Law Union
Ins. Co. [19o8, C. A.] 2 K. B. 863, 885.
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condition of the contract. This familiar phrase has not been given such
a meaning by the American courts.'
It may be noted that in Dawsons, Ltd. v. Bonnin it was not even sug-
gested that the fact that the erroneous statement was inserted in the
proposal by the defendants' own agent should estop them from claiming
the benefit of the breach of warranty, if such there was. Such an




LEGAL CAUSE IN ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE
Whether or not a defendant, guilty of an admittedly negligent act,
should be liable for improbable but proximate consequences of his act
is a question frequently before the courts and one that involves the
whole theory of negligence. The opposing views are illustrated in
two recent cases, one American and the other English. In the former
the defendant negligently threw a burning stick into a body of water
covered with oil. The oil, ignited in this manner, set on fire and
destroyed the plaintiff's wharf. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ordered a new trial because of error relative to the admis-
sion of evidence, and said for the instruction of the court at the retrial
that to cause liability in the defendant the injury to the plaintiff must
have been a probable consequence of his negligence.' In the other
case, the negligent dropping of a plank into the hold of the plaintiff's
ship directly caused a benzine explosion destroying the vessel. A board
of arbitrators found that such a result could not have been reasonably
anticipated to follow the defendant's act. The court held that the plain-
tiff had a cause of action.2
Such cases are conventionally decided according to either the
"Probable Consequence" or the "Proximate and Natural Conse-
quence" rule.2 According to the former, in so far as the question of
causation is concerned, a wrongdoer is liable only for the probable
consequences of his act. This statement expresses two independent
' See Phoenix Mit. Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin (1886) I2O U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct.
500; Reppond v. National Life Ins. Co., supra note 5.
" See 26 C. J. 31o, 311; Arneberg v. Continental Casualty Co. (1922, Wis.)
19o N. W. 97. It probably could not have been claimed in Massachusetts,
New Jersey, or the federal courts. Lowell v. Middlesex Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
(1851, Mass.) 8 Cush. 127; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Marten (1878) 4o N. J. L.
568; Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Building Ass'n. (1902) 183 U. S. 308,
22 Sup. Ct. 133.
1Pittsburgh Forge and Iron Co. v. Dravo Contracting Ca. (1922, Pa.) 116 AtI.
147.
'In re Polemis v. Furness Withy Co. (1921, C. A.) 3 K. B. 56.
' See Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law
(1909) 9 CoL,. L. REv. 16, 136, 154; Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Conse-
quence as the Test of Liability in Negligence (i92) 49 Am. L. REG. (0. s.) 79,
148.
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propositions, namely, liability for probable consequences and non-
liability for improbable consequences. 4  This rule, as applied in the
first instant case, prevails in many American jurisdictions. 5 It has
three generally recognized exceptions: (a) If the probability of some
harm to the plaintiff exists, it is not necessary that injury in the precise
form which in fact took place should have been probable. " (b) If
there is a probability of harm to a group or class of which the plaintiff
is a member, he has a cause of action if injured.7  (c) If the conduct of
the defendant was criminal, quasi-criminal, or even consciously wrong
in the sense of being a voluntary trespass, the courts do not limit
liability to ptobable consequences."
Differing from this is the "Proximate and Natural Consequence"
rule: When negligence is once shown to exist it carries a liability for
the consequences arising from it until the intervention of some divert-
ing force or until the force put in motion by the negligence itself has
become exhausted.9 The second instant case specifically approved and
followed the original English decision which laid down this rule.10
According to this doctrine, "what a man may reasonably anticipate is
important, and may be decisive, in determining whether that act is the
proximate cause of the injury which ensues. If a person had no
reasonable grounds to anticipate that a particular act would or might
result in injury to anybody, then, of course the act would not be negli-
gent at all, but if the act itself is negligent, then the person guilty of it
is equally liable for all its natural and proximate consequences, whether
he could have foreseen them or not. . . . Consequences which follow
in unbroken sequence without an intervening efficient cause, from the
original negligent act, are natural and proximate, and for such conse-
quences the original wrongdoer is responsible even though he could
not have foreseen the particular results which did follow."'1
A difficulty, however, that may sometimes arise under the proximate
and natural consequence rule is to find a breach of duty when the care-
less act of the defendant could not have been reasonably expected to
injure the plaintiff. It is generally said that the duty of ordinary care
'Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911) 25 HARv. L. REv. 103, 114.
'Bell Lumber Co. v. Bayfield Transfer Co. (1gig) 169 Wis. 357, 172 N. W.
955; Ninan v. Bennett (1919) 184 Ky. 591, 212 S. W. 570; Hardwick v. Figgers
(1921, Ga.) io6 S. E. 738.
'Hill v. Winsor (1875) 118 Mass. 251.
'Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting fromn Negligence Without
Impact (9o2) 5o Am. L. REo. (o. s.) 141, 148; Terry, Proximate Consequences
of an Act (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. I0, i.
'Regina v. Saunders (1574, C. P.) 2 Plowd. 473; Wyant v. Crouse (19O1) 127
Mich. 158, 86 N. W. 527.
9 1 Beven, Negligence in Law (3d ed. i9o8) 88.
91Smith V. London, etc., Ry. (187o) L. R. 6 C. P. 14. See Holmes,The Commron
Law (1881) 93. For a discussion and criticism of the rule as applied in these
cases, see Pollock, Liability for Consequences (1922) 38 L. QUART. RE-V. 165.
I Christianson v. Chicago, etc. Ry. (1896) 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 640.
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concerns one's acts in reference to the person, property, or rights of
another; that the duty of care in A to B arises when there is a proba-
bility of harm to B ;12 and that if there is no such probability of harm to
C, there can be no duty towards him.13 If, nevertheless, by some
extraordinary combination of events, as in Smith v. London, etc. 
Ry.,14
or possibly in In re Polernis,'5 C is injured, to allow a recovery against A
would, it is urged, be permitting a plaintiff to maintain an action when
no duty to him was broken. If, because there was no probability of
harm to C, A's act was entirely justifiable in respect to him, should
we penalize A merely because his act did happen to be negligent
towards B ?
Under this view it should be observed that conceivably the acts of the
defendants in the two instant cases, in so far as the respective plaintiffs
are concerned, were not "negligent," since they violated no duty of
care owed to the plaintiffs.-6 The hurling of the stick was negligent
because of the probability that it might injure someone other than the
plaintiff; the dropping of the plank because it might have been reason-
ably expected to injure the cargo in which the plaintiff had no interest,
or one or more of the men working in the hold.'7 To charge the defen-
dants in such cases is to punish them for the accidental results of acts
which were not negligent toward the plaintiffs. This would be contrary
to the general doctrine of non-liability for harm accidentally inflicted,',
Garlaid v. Boston, etc. Ry. (1913) 76 N. H. 556, 86 At. 141. Here the
plaintiff's intestate, a trespasser, standing on a locomotive contrary to the defen-
dant company's rules but with the permission of the engineer, was killed by an
oncoming train through the heedlessness of its engineer. The latter was legally
negligent as to some one, e. g. the engineer of the first train, but not as to plain-
tiff's intestate as to whose presence the engineer of the second train had no notice,
but the second engineer's negligence in fact caused the intestate's death. The
result of this case is not necessarily in conflict with the "Proximate and Natural
Consequence" rule, as it might well be held that the intestate, as a trespasser, had
lost his standing in court.
' If common experience has shown that some such consequence was likely to
follow the act under the circumstances of the case, such result is the "probable"
consequence of the act. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent (1894) 8
HARv. L. RFv. i. Probability in this connection does not mean simply an even
chance that a certain result will ensue. It has been defined as "such a chance of
harm as would induce a prudent man not to run the risk." Smith, Legal Cause in
Actionts of Tort (1911) 25 HAiv. L. REv. 103, at p. 116.
"Supra note 1o.
"Supra note 2.
'* At the new trial the jury may find a foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.
The board of arbitrators did find that some damage to the ship might have
been reasonably anticipated. There actually was a relation, then, between 
the
plaintiff and the defendant. The opinions of the court did not point out a duty,
thinking it sufficient that there was a probability of harm to the workers and
cargo in determining that the act was negligent
"Of course an injury is not "entirely" accidental if the act causing it is
legally negligent toward anyone. Betveen the plaintiff and the defendant, how-
ever, the harm was entirely accidental.
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and to the theory above stated that in the absence of a duty a plaintiff
cannot recover.Y0
Opposed to this reasoning, it has been suggested that the tests of
negligence and of legal cause are quite distinct,2 that the test of proba-
bility of harm should be recognized as the proper method of determin-
ing whether the defendant was under a duty to take care, but if it once
be determined that the defendant's conduct, tried by that standard, was
negligent, the test of foreseeability need not be applied in determining
the extent of his duty to make reparation.21 Foresight of harm fur-
nishes the test of the existence of negligence, 22 but the extent of respon-
sibility therefor is determined by looking "a post" and not "ab ante."2'
These two views of the situation are squarely in conflict. Shall a
blameless sufferer be denied an action against a proved wrongdoer, thus
limiting liability for negligent acts to those as to whom there was a
probability of harm; or should we hold that a person whose admittedly
negligent act has in fact caused another harm should be answerable
in damages to the one so harmed, even though such harm was not
foreseeable ?24 This problem has been largely overlooked by the courts.
A rather novel application of the well settled principle that an attor-
ney is liable to his client for damages proximately resulting from the
attorney's negligence in the performance of his professional duties was
presented in Degen v. Steinbrink (1922) 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 8io. An attorney drew up for his client chattel mortgages on
personal property in the home state and in two foreign states for the
express purpose of creating preferential liens in favor of his client.
The mortgagor having become bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy
decided that the liens entitled the client to $15,ooo. Before payment,
it was discovered by the trustee that the chattel mortgages were
invalid, since they were not drawn in compliance with the statutes, and
the $15,000 went into the general estate of the bankrupt. The client
then had to come in as a general creditor and obtained as his share only
"This idea seems to be the basis of the dissenting opinion of Brett, J., in the
Common Pleas in Smith v. London, etc., Ry., supra note io. See also Bohlen,
op. cit. supra note 3.
" "The measure of the defendant's duty in determining whether a wrong has
been committed is one thing, and the measure of liability where a wrong has been
committed is another." Holmes, J., in Spade v. Lynm, etc. Ry. (1899) 172 Mass.
488, at p. 491, 52 N. E. 747, at p. 749.
Smith, op. cit. 245.
i Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6) 457.
2 Beven, op. cit. 89, note i. The cases here cited by the author seem to indi-
cate that he is merely contending for the rule of Hill v. Winsor, supra note 6.
"If the defendant had acted with a wrongful intent to harm a third person and
while so acting had accidentally harmed the plaintiff, the latter could have
recovered. James v. Campbell (1832, N. P.) 5 Car. & P. 372; Davis v. Collins
(19o4) 69 S. C. 46o, 48 S. E. 469.
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$6,000. A recovery was allowed against the attorney to the extent of
the loss occasioned. Though an attorney is not presumed to know
the statutes of foreign jurisdictions, nevertheless in undertaking to
draw up documents in accord with foreign statutes, there is a duty to
exercise due care and skill by becoming acquainted with the statutory
requirements.1 In this respect, a distinction should be drawn between
errors of judgment, where in fact reasonable care and skill has been
exercised, and simple negligence. 2 Courts hesitate to hold attorneys in
the former class, but are more ready to do so in the latter.3 The instant
decision plainly falls within the latter class. Unless a greater degree of
care is exercised by attorneys, it is not improbable that the doctrine of
caveat advocatus will win its place among classic legal expressions.
Bulls,1 chickens, 2 blind pigs3-now goats.4 It is no cause for sur-
prise that an ordinance providing against goats being left within fifty
feet of a dwelling house should be upheld as constitutional; although
perhaps a formidable attack might have been made upon it as discrim-
inatory, in view of the well known hopelessness of mortals ever severing
the sheep from the goats. The court in passing on the ordinance had
first-hand information of great value to go on; lack of space forbids
more copious examples, but it appears that the goats "made a noise,
which the witness describes as 'Baa.'" All this might have served
merely to set the scene for the determination of a truly momentous
issue in a second case. Rarely do courts meet squarely the tremendous
problems involved in the factors of heredity and environment. The
question was nothing less than whether a kid was a goat.5 "Equity
regards that as one, which ought to be one." "Eventually, why not
now ?" But the court found goats enough in the case, and avoided the
issue. Among the goats one should doubtless count the imprisoned
goat-keepers.
The Jones Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provides for an action for
damages at law for the death of any seaman as a result of personal
injury, and that "in such action all statutes of the United States con-
ferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway
'Byrnes v. Palmer (1897) iS App. Div. I, 45 N. Y. Supp. 479, aff'd. (1899) 16o
N. Y. 699, 55 N. E. lO93; see NOTES AND COMMENTS (1919) 5 CORN.. L. QuART.
6o; 34 An. Dec. 89, note; 52 L. R. A. 883, note.
'(1920) 91 CENT. L. JourR. 333; see (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 6o5.
(1914) 9 BENCH AND BAR, (N. s.) 27.
1 (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 555.
(1917) 26 ibid. 250.
Pasn.
'Ex parte Mathews (1922, Calif. App.) 2o9 Pac. 22o.
'Ex parte Lusher, ibid. 223.
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employees shall be applicable."'- This Act represents the latest step in
the legislative endeavor to protect the "wards of admiralty." In inter-
preting such legislation the courts invoke all the rules of maritime law
that are favorable to the seaman. Perhaps a non-existent maritime
rule was invoked in the recent case of Lynott v. Great Lakes Transit
Corporation (1922, Sup. Ct.) 195 N. Y. Supp. 13. The defendant
supplied a smooth narrow plank for the use of the crew in boarding
the vessel while in dock. The slope of the plank from the dock to the
vessel was from.thirty to forty-five degrees. The deceased had been
employed by the defendant about a month, had been on several trips,
and at the time of the accident was engaged for another trip. On
returning to the vessel at dusk he slipped from the plank and was
drowned. In an action under the Jones Act it was held that since
the maritime law, and not the common law, was involved, the doctrine
of assumption of obvious risks did not apply.
In the absence of a statute admiralty recognizes no right of action to
recover damages for death.2 By the Federal Employer's Liability Act
relating to railroads the risks of employment are not assumed "in
any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute
enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death
of such employee." 3 In all other cases under that Act the doctrine of
assumption of risk is not abolished but obtains as at common law.4
Consequently the court in the instant case rejected the doctrine not
because of the statute but because the action was that of a seaman and
the rules of the maritime law, as distinguished from those of the
common law, should be applied.
The cases are somewhat confused as to when the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk should apply in Maritime law. Some' have held that the
doctrine of assumption of risk is applied in Admiralty as fully as in
other branches of jurisprudence, notwithstanding the rule that dam-
ages will in some cases of concurrent negligence be divided.5
IAct of June 5, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. ioo7). It has been held that that part of
the Employer's Liability Act as to removal of causes is not adopted as part of the
Marine Act. Weimler v. Robi Line S. S. Co. (1921, W. D. Wash.) 277 Fed. 812.
'The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140; Western Futel Co. V'.
Garcia (ii, C. C. A. 9th) 255 Fed. 817; Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Turner
(1920, C. C. A. 6th) 269 Fed. 334.
'Act of April 22 1908 (35 Stat. at L. 66).
'Seaboard Airline Ry. vt. Horton (1914) 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635; Jacobs
t. Southern Ry. (1916) 241 U. S. 229, 36 Sup. Ct. 589.
'The Scandinavia (19o7, D. Me.) 156 Fed. 403; Sun Co. vt. Phila. Transporta-
tion & Lighterage Co. (1917, E. D. Pa.) 244 Fed. 58o. The fall of a ladder
caused by the pitching or rolling of a ship, or by the sliding or sinking of coal, is
a risk of employment assumed by a coal passer and fireman while at sea. Balleng
v. N. Y. & C. M. S. S. Co. (1899, Sup. Ct) 28 Misc. 238, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1O74.
Where a steamer has been tied up for the winter, a seaman has been held to have
assumed the risks incident to staying aboard without watchmen. Lang v. Willians
Transp. Line (1898) 119 Mich. 8o, 77 N. W. 633. A steamship pilot who chose
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The policy of rejecting the doctrine of assumption of risk in the
opposing line of cases is based upon the peculiar situation in which
the seaman aboard ship is placed.6 He has not the privilege of using
his own judgment, or of quitting the ship's service if he apprehends
danger, as does an ordinary workman on shore.7  Obedience to officers
is the necessary law of the ship; disobedience is criminal.s An exam-
ination of the latter class of cases discloses the fact that where the doc-
trine of assumption of risk has been held not to apply the injuries were
received while at sea.9 It is equally noticeable that those cases which
discuss the peculiar situation of the seaman do so in relation to his
being on board ship.' 0 By implication therefrom, assumption of risk
should be a good defense where the seaman is in as good a position as
an employee on land. The familiar law with respect to the duty of a
seaman to obey the orders of the master has no application when he is
not at sea,"- and in the principal case the deceased was not under any of
the restraints generally recognized to exist in such cases. The fact,
therefore, that the action was under the maritime law does not of
itself seem to be sufficient cause for the rejection of the doctrine of
assumption of obvious risks, however desirable the rejection of that
doctrine may be on other grounds.
to sleep in a chartroom having no opening but the doorway, having knowledge of
the attendant circumstances, assumed the risk of injury by asphyxiation. Murch v.
Thomas Wilson's Sons & Co. Ltd. (1897) 168 Mass. 408, 47 N. E. iii. No
sufficient reason appearing why the breaking of a rider should have been antici-
pated by the employer, such danger as lay in the possibility of its breaking was
a risk assumed by the libelant as incident to his employment The Henry B. Fiske
(i9o5, D. Mass.) 141 Fed. I88. The risks attendant on service on a steamboat
engaged in the Mississippi River trade, being well known to those employed, are
assumed by the crew. Red River Linw v. Cheatham (1894, C. C. A. 5th) 6o Fed.
517; Red River Line v. Smith (19oo, C. C. A. 5th) 99 Fed. 520.
A seaman does not assume the risk involved in the use, under orders, of patently
defective appliances furnished him by the master. Lafourche Packet Co. v.
Henderson (1899, C. C. A. 5th) 94 Fed. 871. Liability cannot be avoided on the
ground that the seaman knew of the defect when he shipped. Cricket S. S. Co. v.
Parry (I92O, C. C. A. 2d) 263 Fed. 523.
'The Edith Godden (1885, S. D. N. Y.) 23 Fed. 43; The Colusa (i918, C. C. A.
9th) 248 Fed. 21.
" The Frank & Willie (i8gi, S. D. N. Y.) 45 Fed. 494.
9 Lafourche Packet Co. v. Henderson, supra note 6; Cricket S. S. Co. v. Parry,
supra note 6.
0 The Edith Godden, supra note 7; Lafourche Packet Co. v. Henderson, supra
note 6; The Coltusa, supra note 7; The Frank & Willie, supra note 8.
" The Scandinavia, supra note 5.
